PATTERNS OF EAST TO WEST MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN MIGRATION SYSTEMS POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF MIGRATION CONTROL[1]

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INTRODUCTION

European migration processes are determined by a variety of actors but they and their role have changed over time. At the turn of the century migration flows are being shaped by the EU and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) migration systems and their interactions: the EU with the core of "old" member-states and the CIS with the "core" of Russia.

With the disintegration of the USSR the previous migration system between the different socialist republics has gradually decayed since the 1990s. Some of the former Soviet republics have become EU member states (for example the Baltic States), the others have very peculiar relations with Russia (for example Georgia), while there are republics that still form some unions (the CIS). Russia continues to be the main attraction for most of the countries in the post-Soviet space. About eighty percent of all population movements of the former Soviet Union (FSU) take part inside CIS countries' boundaries and around 50% of all international migrants from CIS countries go to Russia.

During socialist times Central European countries had enjoyed a greater degree of freedom. They basically formed a buffer zone between the Western and Eastern European countries. As the socialist system collapsed and the iron curtain ceased to exist many of the Central and East European countries continued to play the role of a transit corridor between East and West in spite of their membership in the EU (Molodikova 2007).

Among EU countries there are also large differences in migration patterns and migration control. The EU's migration control system has significant variations between member states with regard to control and registration of migrants, visa requirements and relationships with neighbouring countries.

Through the analysis of directions and compositions of the main migration flows of the CIS migration system as related to the EU system we evaluate the possibilities and the limits of migration control in the East–West migration flows between CIS and EU countries.

Like a sensitive barometer, migration has been closely linked to the transformational processes in Europe since the dissolution of the Soviet system. The gravity center of the CIS migration system is Russia and the dynamics of migration processes in CIS countries are closely related to migration policies between Russia and other CIS countries and influence the flow to the EU. There are some peculiarities of migration flows between CIS and EU countries:

- Demographic and socio-economic differences between CIS and EU countries are important engines of migration flows which help the sending and receiving countries to manage their problems of development;
- The main migration flows in the CIS system have changed direction over time. In the last few years different centres attracting migrants appeared among CIS countries, which include Russia (also Ukraine and Kazakhstan). The development of these countries changes their place in the migration system and migration flows have become diversified when new centers of economic attraction have emerged;
- Migration flows formed new ethnic diasporas in CIS and in EU and which have now become an important subjects in the international migration policy of the sending and receiving countries;
- Especially in borderland countries, overlapping EU and CIS, cross-border circular migration plays an important role in regional development and in co-ethnic relations and in the development of migration controls;
- Transit migration through the CIS–EU border is constant and the mainly illegal migration flow has changed its routes and ethnic composition over the years and sets limits for the migration policy of CIS countries;
- Informal economic practices and corruption in official institutions make migration control in CIS countries even more problematic.

This paper gives an overview of the main migration trends of the CIS migration system in the context of the development of EU migration and migration control and seeks to explain the peculiarities of the CIS migration system's development.

MIGRATION SYSTEM THEORY AND EUROPEAN MODELS OF MIGRA-
TION FLOWS

According to Massey et al. (1998), migration systems are international la-
bour markets of certain territories, the terrains of which are created by various
treaties and trade agreements. The same authors also suggested that *'Multi-
polar systems are possible, whereby a set of dispersed core countries receive
immigrants from a set of overlapping sending nations'*. They also argue that
*'nations may belong to more than one migration system, but multiple member-
ship is more common among sending than receiving nations….Countries may
join or drop out of a system in response to social change, economic fluctuations
or political upheaval'*. (Massey et al. 1993. 454).

Some authors argue that such a system of countries has to have a relatively
large and stable quantity of exchanged information (Massey et el 1998. 61) on
the one hand and, on the other, migrants of different types (tourists, students,
workers, etc.) also create flows of goods, capital and ideas. The system is sup-
ported by economic, cultural and political relations (Fawcett, J. and F. Arnold
1987; Gurak and Caces 1992; Massey 1998). Gurak and Caces 1992). The
scholars also argue that exchanges of people, goods, and capital have to be
more intense within a migration system than with countries outside it.

When analysing the European migration system some scholars have sug-
gested various binding factors, including for instance (1) congruence of their
migration policies, (2) close economic and political ties between them; (3)
comparable level of economic development (and similar cultural background);
(6) geographic proximity; (7) common migration patterns (Zlotnik 1992).
Massey adds to this a shared public concern about migration issues (Massey
1998).

In the border areas of these subsystems specific conditions of mobility apply
as people have equal opportunities to participate in both systems. In our case
clearly there are open channels between some parts of the EU and CIS systems.
These channels should be the main concern for control over migration because
they facilitate intensive exchange of people, goods and money (Map 1).

Map 1
A typology of European countries concerning migration patterns in 2006

The differences in migration policy of frontier countries of the EU in their relation with overlapping borderland non–EU countries support the existence of local subsystems. Twenty years ago only 4 such subsystems were pointed out by Zlotnik (1992), namely the semi-peripheral Mediterranean, Scandinavian, and UK-Ireland systems, as well as a mainland regime. Massey assumed that 6 core zones existed in 1980–1990 within the European migration system with extensive migration flows (Massey et al. 1998. 119). We can suppose that the number of interaction areas might have increased since then and the directions and composition of flows might be more complicated because of the existence of new forms of mobility (Düvell and Molodikova 2009).

The collapse of the USSR did not destroy the migration system of CIS countries, which has developed active relations with the European system. The definition of the CIS migration system (Tishkov V. et al. 2005) or Eurasian migration system according to Irina Ivakhnuk (2009) has been given as: "*composed of a group of countries connected by historical, cultural, economic, demographic and political links and which lead to structural transformations of*

sending and receiving the countries, and reproduces and support the direction of migration flows".

This supports the idea of the possible existence of different subsystems and the multiple relations of some countries with other migration systems. The EU enlargement in the 2000s has incorporated new border regions and significant efforts have been made to formulate a new adequate security system for border control.

The contemporary development and relations of the EU and CIS systems are characterized by the integration of some former Soviet states (Estonia, Lithuania Latvia) into the migration system of the EU, coupled with an Eastern partnership policy concerning cooperation with neighbouring third countries.

The EU countries enjoy free movement while the CIS countries also have the same free population movement within their system. But in contrast to the EU many of these countries have open borders with non-CIS countries and cannot protect themselves from transit, asylum and illegal flows from external countries.

The main difference between the European Union (EU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the strong integration processes within the EU including a common circulation of labour, goods and services common currency, common law and common policies for homogenising living standards among EU and accessing countries (Düvell and Molodikova 2009).

This common policy has been developed in order to reach the following objectives: (1) to manage legal migration more effectively, increasing cooperation between Member States to reduce illegal migration; (2) to create a common European asylum system; (3) to strengthen integration policies for immigrants; and (4) to improve cooperation with third countries on migration issues (Pratt 2009).

The CIS countries' system is characterized by mixed trends of integration and disintegration (Zaionchkovskaya 2009). The CIS system is gradually decaying and the differences between former Soviet countries are growing. Although Russia has a free-visa area, employment and residence are still controlled by administrative means. We can see that the international and migration policy of Russia and the CIS are full of contradictions. As a result, economic migration and immigration from one CIS country to another is often irregular (Düvell and Molodikova 2009).

CIS MIGRATION SYSTEM AND MIGRATION CONTROL

Undoubtedly, international migration in CIS countries plays an important role in the life of their citizens. Russia, being the core destination country, can radically alter the destiny of millions of people in the post-soviet space by

shaping and reshaping its migration policy. After the dissolution of the FSU, Russia proclaimed itself the successor of the USSR and has tried to re-establish its influence in the former Soviet space.

The CIS migration system has been supported by a common free-visa[3] area of former Soviet states which was introduced by the Bishkek Treaty in 1994 (Mukomel 2005). A huge number of links maintains Russia's attractiveness for migrants. Kinship, the existence of ethnic diasporas in Russia, the common language of communication (Russian), complementary labour markets, inter-connected transportation systems and similar educational systems have all played an important role in maintaining the migration system (Table 1).

Table 1

Binding and dividing factors in the migration system of CIS countries

Binding factors:	Dividing factors:
Common border and free visa regime 10 CIS countries;	The disintegration processes within the CIS countries
The principal migration flows are movements within the CIS region (more than 80%);	Complicated historical legacies;
Intra-regional migration often based on family and cultural ties and social network;	Unequal start – up possibilities;
Transportation and communication systems inherited from the soviet period;	Differences in border control;
Common former language of communication (Russian);	Differences in policies and geopolitical situations;
Similar educational systems;	National policy promoting native language and culture
Various economic and political agreements and treaties between CIS countries	Differences of state policy (Russia-oriented or EU-oriented)
Historical memory	Political games to blame Russia for Soviet past
Free visa regime	Fears of some countries about their sovereignty
Complementary demographic needs in labour markets' supply /demand needs	Competition of interests of some countries for cheap labour forces
Diaspora / minorities' relations	Different political interests of the national elite
Close location	Introduction of visa control with some countries
High labour demand for cheap labour force	Competition for cheap labour with other CIS (e.g. Kazakhstan) and Western countries

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the new political elites set up several intergovernmental groups, commissions and committees dealing with mi-

[3] Currently Russia has a visa regime with 5 out of 15 Soviet countries. Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia), Georgia and Turkmenistan out of CIS.

gration (CIS migration council, customs union, the control of drugs and criminals (Table 1). Agreements on cooperation in the sphere of labour migration and social protection of economic migrants were signed immediately after dissolution of the USSR within the CIS framework and since 1992 similar agreements have been signed between many CIS countries, allowing people coming to Russia with USSR passports to settle using the old Soviet passport, which remained valid as Russia did not introduce new passports until 2002.

Table 2
The unions and organizations of integration among CIS countries[4]

Country	CIS 1991	OTSC 1992	(EurAsEC) 2000	Union of Russia and Byelorussia 1996	BSCO 1992 (1998)	SCO[5] 1996–1997	GUAM
Azerbaijan	X				X		X
Armenia	X	X			X		
Byelorussia	X	X	X	X			
Georgia	(1)				X		X
Kazakhstan	X	X	X			X	
Kirgistan	X	X	X			X	
Moldova	X				X		X
Russia	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	**X**	
Tajikistan	X	X	X			X	
Turkmenis-tan	X						
Uzbekistan	X	X	(2)			X	(2)
Ukraine	X				X		X

(1) Georgia stepped out from CIS after the war between Russia –Georgia, 18 August 2009. Georgia declared this decision, 18 August 2008. Nevertheless Georgia remains participant of a number of previously signed agreements (about 70).

(2) 12 December 2008 Uzbekistan asked for a temporary suspension concerning her membership.

Russia established some unions trying to maintain the relationships between the former Soviet republics. The most important union is based on the Treaty of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of FSU countries signed on 8th of December 1991. The members enjoy free movement of people, common control of borders and borderland areas, and cooperation in the fight against inter-

[4] http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/databases.xml?lang=ru&nic=databases retrade 15 May2009

[5] Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, China, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. The Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed at the SCO summit held in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital in 2001/

national crime, drugs, money laundering and terrorism. In 2007 these countries signed an agreement on the creation of a Council of Heads of Migration Services of CIS countries with its headquarters in Belarus. Now the countries are discussing a Convention of CIS on rights of labour migrants and their families for the unification of the labour market (Table 2.).

The other important organization for security and military cooperation is the Organization on Treaty on Common Security (OTCS), which was created in 1992. This organization was supported and initiated by Russia as a counterbalance to NATO.

In 1995, Customs unions between these countries were established as the Eurasian Economic Community Common Economic Zone or "(EurAsEc)" in 2000. This was created within the framework of a Custom Union and United Economic Area. The main goal was the creation of a common market and common economic area. In April 2007 the Interparliamentary Assembly of the EurAsEc worked out the principles of a coherent social policy for the EurAsEc and defined steps to implement it in the fields of employment, social welfare, labour migration and social security funds, education, health and culture. To help realise this program the Council on Migration Policy was established in May 2008 under the auspices of the Integration Committee of the EurAsEc. The plan is that Russia, Kazakhstan and Belorussia will complete the work on a unified custom area by July 2011.

The issue of controlling the borderland with Western Europe pushed Russia (which has a border with Western Europe in Kaliningrad oblast and Karelia autonomous republic) into a regional Union of Byelorussia and Russia (URIB) in 1996, which secured Russian access to the Western border. This Union was proclaimed as a confederation, but the common constitution and common currency is still under negotiation. Nevertheless, citizens of both countries have equal rights to travel, residence, work and welfare in both countries in spite of different passports, currencies and some other attributes of independent states.

There are two more organizations Russia participated among other member states: Black See Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC)[6] and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)[7].

Russia is also not a member in the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM. These countries introdused unilaterally free visa

[6] Was established in 1992 but officialy in 1998 as multilateral political and economic initiative aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the Member States, as well as to ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighbourly relations in the Black Sea region. There are 26 memberstates currently participate in BSEC (http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx)
[7] Founded by some CIS countries and China. The Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation (was signed at the SCO summit held in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital in 2001).

regime for nationals of OECD countries. This organization can be consided as the attemp to create counterbalance to CIS membership and to hegemony of Russia.

Combating illegal migration

The issue of illegal migration has been high on the agenda, especially after September 11th 2001. One of the tasks of CIS countries includes the regulation of labour migration and fight against illegal migration, and in this connection the following institutions have been established:

- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine – form common economic space (the decision of 2006).
- Cooperation agreement of the CIS in struggle against illegal migration of March, 6th, 1998;
- Joint Commission on the Cooperation Agreement framework (created in 2004).
- OTSC common security program of actions;
- Cooperation between ministries of Internal Affairs based on bilateral and multilateral agreements.
- By the Council of Leaders of the Commonwealth States the adoption (in Kazan 2005) of a program of CIS cooperation in combating illegal migration for 2006–2008.

These institutions provided the necessary legal framework for common actions. A meeting of representatives of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and CIS countries' migration services in June 2006 elaborated the main directions on cooperation in the following areas:

- harmonisation of national legislation to develop unified approaches in the migration sphere;
- formation of databanks on foreign citizens and stateless persons;
- acceleration of bilateral agreements on readmission between the Commonwealth countries.

Currently only Russia, Ukraine and Moldova have similar agreements with the EU and they are now in the process of signing bilateral agreements with particular EU countries.

CIS 'neighbourhood policy' and the creation of free-visa area

Russian efforts in shaping and management of CIS migration system are also reflected in its neighbourhood policy, which allowed border regions to conduct some international economic and migration activities based on transborder cooperation. These activities are typical for Siberian Russia and Kazakhstan, some neighbouring regions (Omsk, Semipalatinsk and other cities) and the Russia–China borderland (Chita, Khabarovsk, Primorski krai), and allow simplified border crossing of people, goods and economic activities in these regions.

In addition Russia actively attempts to expand visa free regimes with neighbouring countries or simplify the visa regime with EU countries. In 2008 it introduced free movement for non-citizens of the Baltic States.[8] These people now enjoy the opportunity to go and work in EU countries and in Russia. Broad cooperation in free visa regimes was created with the majority of Western Balkan states (former Yugoslavia) in 2007–2008. Even Croatia, which is close to entering EU, from 2009 has allowed Russian citizens to visit the country without a visa during the summer period (for tourist purposes). Israel also introduced a visa free bilateral agreement in autumn 2008, and Russia has similar agreements with some Latin American countries (for example Argentina and Cuba).

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY OF THE EU

The beginning of the 1990s for Western Europe was characterized by the euphoria of socialism's destruction and the dream of an «integrated and free Europe». However from the middle of the 90s with the enlargement process the dilemma of how to create a 'ring of friends' contributing to EU security and supporting peace and stability in the region and yet making no promise of EU membership has brought into life the idea of a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The mission of this policy is understood as a step-by-step reorganization of the region around the EU borders in order to spread «European values and freedoms» and to acquire security.

The slogans «Europe without borders» and «free and integrated Europe» have brought into being two political approaches:

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[8] We mean Russian –speaking population of Baltic states who has no citizenship of these countries because of their ethnicity but has special passport of alien which is valid now for movement in the EU and in Russia.

- to consider "others" as a source of instability and danger, and
- to arrange EU external space in such a way as to keep the most dangerous countries as far away as possible, in short, creating fortress Europe.

The ENP migration policy was introduced in 2003 using different approaches to the Southern, Northern and Eastern borderland of the EU. The success of this policy is difficult to evaluate, because while in the field of border and document-checking technology there have been some positive changes, in terms of flows of illegal migrants and failed attempts at illegal cross-border activity the results are not so impressive. Partly this situation is determined by the peculiarities of the ethnic relations of the EU with the neighbouring countries with mixed population.

The European Union Constitution on Border Check, Asylum and Immigration (2004) articulated the importance of cooperating with third countries to prevent illegal migration and human trafficking. Within the framework of the Global Approach to Migration the Borders Agency (FRONTEX) was created, and EU launched some other initiatives, that have attracted critical academic attention. Some authors suggested that it rather demonstrates the power geopolitics of the EU when it defines all Europe as "the EU" and 'other surrounding space" (Christiansen and Jorgensen 2000).

The development of the European Union's security system now aims at unifying internal and external control and trying to bind the diverse goals of the member states. But the effectiveness of migration control varies a lot between the different countries (Lahav and Guiradon 2006). EU attempts to externalize border control are embedded into a Eurocentric approach, which assumes that the main migration policy of the EU will be "friendly" cooperation with third countries to combat and prevent illegal migration and control refugee flows while at the same time supplying a labour force needed in Western Europe with its ageing population.

Some scholars are sceptical about the effectiveness of the ENP policy and have argued that the main assistance has come in the legislative field or in relation to trafficking victims, whose numbers are relatively low (about 2800 for every country for 2002–2006). The real problem is the concentration of asylum seekers, transit and illegal migrants in the Western borderland. In addition the Eastern borderland of the EU is porous because the local population actively participates in this business as well as corrupt civil servants (Malinovska 2009; Molodikova 2009).

In this context some authors (e.g. Billibar 2004. 219) have argued that: '*No European "identity' can be opposed to any other in the world because there exists no absolute borderline between the historical cultural territory of Europe*

and surrounding spaces". Christopher Browning and Joenniemi Pertti (2008) discussed the EU approach towards geographical division of the attached neighbouring countries according to the level of their 'Europeanness' and evaluate the results of debates about ENP in the context of the EU's various geopolitical strategies. The formation of "ring of friends" relations depends also on the position of "outsiders [who] are willing to become like us'….accepting EU norms, values, and practices are seen as non-negotiable" (Browning and Pertti 2008. cit p. 545). Concerning migration the EU imperial system with its centre in Brussels tries to control another imperial model of CIS countries with Moscow as the centre.

The development of readmission policies

Within the frame of ENP and EU-Russia cooperation, Russia, Moldova and Ukraine signed a readmissions agreement with the EU in 2007 and ratified it in 2008 with the amendments to the Law 'On Foreigners', 'On Refugee' and the modification of reception centers, trainings of border guard personal, improvements in border management control and prevention of trafficking. For these purposes the EU allocated 3.6 billions euro between 2002–2007 for Ukraine (European Commission 2007).[9] The effective realization of a readmission agreement required the creation of an effective information system, but none of the CIS countries have such a system, although the Russian Federation has already started to create one (FMS report for 2009).

A readmission agreement was also signed with Ukraine in June, 2007 (and ratified in 2008) and this raised fears that the country would be transformed into a "depot" of illegal migrants. Such a threat, certainly, exists. The effectiveness of implementation of the readmission agreement can come about only through a chain of such agreements within all the sending countries involved. The only positive result for Ukraine was that Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia signed a local border control agreement allowing people living within a 50 km EU zone to move more easily across the borders in both directions.

The readmission agreement between the EU and Moldova also came into force on 1 January 2008. Moldova also fails concerning control over borders and on illegal migrants who can be kept on its territory according to the readmission agreement. The agreement requires these CIS countries to take care of returned or illegal migrants, but they have poor capacities for such a job.

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[9] In contrast to that the financial provision for detention of illegal migrants is small. For example, in 2003 Ukraine spent approximately 20 greivnas (or about 2.5 USD) on the detained migrants per day. The conditions were awful/ Often during the procedure of at least 10% of the applicants disappear (Malinovska 2009).

Within the frame of the ENP program the EU has tried to support several projects in the field of migration and has promised to simplify the visa procedure for Moldovans. For example, in 2007 a Common Visa Application Centre was opened in Moldova for 9 EU countries under the management of the Hungarian Embassy. The authorities of Moldova also cooperate with CIS countries like Russia and Ukraine in the field of labour migration and controlling illegal migration and the trafficking of human beings.

Ethnic borderland migration and circulation of labour between CIS and EU

Some EU members have their own interest in the neighbourhood where their co-ethnics live. Hungary, for example, pursues a policy of supporting ethnic Hungarians living in third countries (mainly Ukraine and Serbia). In Hungary in 2001 the Parliament accepted a law on providing special status for Hungarians living abroad concerning certain social economic and cultural rights (Melegh 2001, 2002).

This led to some new practices of ethnic Hungarian political parties in Ukraine concerning migration. For example, Ukrainian Hungarian national parties want to attract voters of co-ethnics through the dissemination of ethnic cards (guaranteeing the above privileges) and Schengen visas in exchange for support in elections. "Our families got the Hungarian cards and Schengen visas very simply. We just have to go to our Hungarian party meetings and promise to vote for them."[10]

Poland also introduced new simplifying visa regulations for Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian[11] citizens and also the ethnic cards for ethnic Poles in 2007. The act on cards for Polish co-ethnics came into force in 2008, according to which Polish co-ethnics who live mainly in CIS countries can get free multiple long term visas and work without any work permit, as well as receiving free education, access to the medical emergency system and 50% discounts for train tickets.[12]

Another move is the declaration of president of Romania Trojan Basescu on possibilities for providing a Romanian passport and immediate citizenship for Moldovans. This declaration was made after the unrest of youngsters in April 2009 in Chisinau and it immediately created long queues in post offices to send applications for Romanian passports in spite of the fact that only 2% of Moldova population support the idea of union with Romania (Mosnuaga 2009).

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[10] From two interviews of the author in March and April 2009.
[11] For 6 months [0]possibility to work in Poland.
[12] Timofeev Alexet. Pass into Grate Poland (Propusk v velikyy Polshy),
    14 May 2008 «Rosbalt », http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0333/gazeta010.php

According to some experts, about 100,000 Moldovans already hold Romanian, Russian or Bulgarian passports (Mosnuaga 2007). The introduction of special ethnic cards for ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Poles by Hungary and Poland, special passports of Ukrainians living abroad (by Ukraine), and discussions on the introduction of special ethnic identity cards for Russians abroad in the Russian Parliament are real challenges for migration control both for the EU and for the CIS countries.

POPULATION MOVEMENT IN THE CIS SYSTEM AND EU MIGRATION CONTROL

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has united 11 Post-Soviet countries with a total population of about 280 million. All these countries vary by geographical location, size, territory, population and also in terms of social and economic development (Table 3)**.** Russian GNP, for instance, exceeds that of some other CIS countries by 12 times. In turn, all CIS countries including Russia are below the standard of living and economic development of Western countries, and even the majority of countries of Central Europe (Table 4).

Table 3
*Comparison of Ukraine and Moldova Belarus and Russia to EU-27
concerning some demographic indices*

	Moldova	Ukraine	Belarus	Russia	EU-27
Population (2007) mln.	3.6	46.5	9.7	142.2	493.3
Projected population size 2030 mln.	3.2	38.9	8.6	124.2	509.1
Net migration per 1000 (2002–2006)	-1.0	-0.3	+4.1	+1.0	3.7
TFR (2006)	1.22	1.33	1.29	1.29	1.53
Male life expectancy	64.6	62.3	62.8	60.4	74.6
Female life expectancy	72.4	73.8	75.0	73.2	80.9
% of old population (above 65)	10.3	16.4	14.6	14.0	17.0

Source: www.populationeurope. org.

Table 4

Several characteristics of the development of CIS countries and EU countries integrated into the East-West migration vector

Countries	Population, mln as of 01.01.2007	Population increase by 2000, %	Urban population, %	Natural growth for 1000 in 2006	2025 population forecast, mln.	GNP per head, USD, 2005
Germany	82,3	95	73,4	-148,9	80,9	29210
Italy	59,1	60	67,6	2,1	61,6	28840
Spain	44,4	412	76,7	6,5	52,1	25820
Greece	11,1	73	60,4	111,4	11,5	23620
Czech Republic	10,2	89	73,5	1,3	10,5	20140
Portugal	10,6	180	57,6	3,4	11,2	19730
Hungary	10,0	78	66,3	-31,7	9,7	16940
Russia	142,2	97	73,0	-4,8	128,5	15760
Estonia	1,3	88	69,4	-2,4	1,2	15420
Lithuania	3,3	132	66,6	-13,5	3,1	14220
Poland	38,1	99	61,5	4,5	37,6	13490
Latvia	2,2	88	68	-10,8	2,0	13480
Romania	21,5	70	53,7	-38,6	20,4	8940
Belarus	9,7	97	72,8	-4,3	9,0	7890
Kazakhstan	15,4	103	57,4	9,4	17,1	7730
Ukraine	46,5	95	67,8	-6,4	41,6	6720
Armenia	3,2	100	64,1	3,2	3,4	5060
Georgia	4,6[3]	100	523	0,2[6]	4,1	3270
Moldova	3,9[2]	100	41,3	-1,5	3,7	2150
Uzbekistan	26,7	107	36,0	15,5	32,9	2020
Kyrgyzstan	5,2	106	34,8	15,9	6,6	1870
Tajikistan	7,1	113	26,3	22,1	9,4	1260
Turkmenistan	6,7[4]	125	474	13,1[6]	6,6[8]	876

Sources:

[1] CIS Statistics according to the national data

[2] Country in total, CIS statistics estimations

[3] As of 01.01.2006, CIS statistics estimations

[4] As of 01.01.2006, present population

[5] CIS statistics

[6] The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, 2007, p. 542

[7] World Population Data Sheet/Population Reference Bureau (PRB) /Population and sociétés N 436, juillet-aout 2007, INED

[8] Estimation on the amount of population of Turkmenistan concerning the base 2007 year is 5,4 mln. people, which is different from the CIS statistics estimations according to which population in Turkmenistan was 6,7 mln. people, as of 01.01.2006. Due to this fact, the forecast is much lower. Population et Sociétés, N 436. (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

Eurostat: http://nui.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en

As a consequence of almost ten years of open borders between CIS countries and Central and Eastern European countries after the collapse of the socialist system large numbers of citizens of the former USSR migrated through this region to Western Europe, Israel, Germany and USA, and have created diasporas in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in many countries of the West. They are now important pull factors for attracting compatriots from CIS countries. At the same time Chinese, Vietnamese, Afghani diasporas have also appeared in CIS countries (Tishkov et al. 2005)

As mentioned above, Russia is the centre of the CIS migration system and center of attraction of migrants from all CIS countries. For economic migrants from CIS countries the difference in wages at home and in Russia is a significant motivation for migration. For example, the average wage across Russia is 16 400 roubles (about 600 USD per month,) the salary in Moscow is 27 000 roubles (or 1200 USD), in the Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous region it is 34 900 roubles (1500 USD), and in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous region it is 48 500 roubles or 1700 UDS (February 2008). In comparison in Kazakhstan the average wage was 391 USD per month, in Belarus it is 308 USD per month, in Ukraine it is 244 USD, in Armenia 201 USD, in Moldova 149 USD and in Azerbaijan 146 USD per month. The worst situation was in Kyrghistan 89 with USD per month, Tajikistan with 49 USD, Georgia with 50 USD and Uzbekistan with 60 USD.[13]

Beyond the income differences there are other factor shaping the migration movement in the CIS migration system. There is a huge terrestrial borderline of Russia and unfinished demarcation processes of borders with CIS and non CIS countries. In some parts of the border the control technical support is very poor and people can easily migrate across the Russia–Kazakhstan, Russia–Belarus or Russia–Ukraine border.

The high level of unemployment in the majority of CIS countries is also an important push factor to migrate to Russia where unemployment has a structural character and there are categories of employment opportunities available that are not attractive for the local population. The attractiveness of Russia is also related to the common language, knowledge of Russian realities, traditions and cultures. However this advantageous position for Russia may change. There is already a competition between Russia and Kazakhstan and Ukraine concerning economic migrants, and Azerbaijan is also attracting returning Azeri migrants from Russia. In fact the generally high level of xenophobia in Russia and policy corruption are major push factor for migrants to go to other countries instead of Russia (Mukomel 2008).

Differences in the demographic situation also shape migration flows between CIS countries because of the high demand for cheap labour in Russia,

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[13] The data for March, 2007 (http://www.cisstat.com/rus/), the data across Georgia and Uzbekistan – 2005.

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The population of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are shrinking because of a natural decrease which is partially compensated by migration, whereas the population of Central Asian countries is growing rapidly because of a high natural increase. Thus, the demographic potential of CIS countries complement each other, pushing toward labour market integration (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

The geographical location of CIS between the developing overpopulated countries of Southern and East Asia, on the one hand, and the developed European countries, on the other hand, forms a natural channel for transit migration according to Ivakhnuk (2009) and Zaionchkovskaya (2009).

Ethnic factors of migration flow have not changed for the CIS system during the last 20 years. The main tendency throughout this period has been movement to Russia'which involves between 40 and 70 per cent of all immigrants between the countries of the Commonwealth.

The ethnic composition in CIS countries has changed since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The population of the CIS countries is actively searching for migration opportunities outside the system. Ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Armenians use ethnic emigration channels to go to the USA, Israel and Germany. For example, in 2007 three quarters of emigrants to Israel, about 60% to Germany, and half in the USA from Russia were ethnic Russians. This trend indicates a decrease in the possibilities for legal emigration because of rigid rules of entrance to the western countries (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

Diversification of migration flows

Since the beginning of the 2000s a diversification of the main migration flows has been taking place, with some new attraction centers for migrants emerging. Kazakhstan since 2003 and Ukraine since 2005 have had positive net migration (Table 5). After Russia and Belorussia these are the other two countries in the region which now have net immigration inflow. It should be mentioned that Kazakhstan is the only country among the Post-Soviet countries where the titular nation is not showing aspirations for migration to the West or to other Commonwealth states. As mentioned above the country gains migrants from all neighbouring countries.

Table 5
*Net migration from CIS countries and Baltic States to Russia by ethnicity,
2003–2007 thousand people**

Ethnicity	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total	**74,6**	**74,2**	**133,4**	**143,2**	**243,6**
Russian	40,5	44,9	72,5	63,3	78,0
Belorussians	-0,1	0,3	1,2	0,7	1,2
Moldovans	0,6	0,5	1,2	1,9	3,9
Ukranians	5,1	4,3	9,6	9,8	17,9
South Caucasus	**6,1**	**3,7**	**8,9**	**16,2**	**41,6**
Azeries	0,6	0,4	1,7	4,5	14,1
Armenians	4,8	2,9	6,6	10,8	25,8
Georgians	0,7	0,4	0,6	0,9	1,7
Central Asia	**2,6**	**2,0**	**4,7**	**8,7**	**27,5**
Kirgiz	0,2	0,3	1,3	2,3	7,5
Tajiks	0,7	0,5	1,2	2,4	9,0
Turkmens	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,5
Uzbeks	1,4	1,0	2,0	3,8	10,5
Kazahs	-1,7	-1,9	-1,5	-1,9	-1,4
Other ethnic groups with autonomous units in Russia or living traditionally in Russia	10,1	8,1	13,8	16,6	25,7
Including:					
Ossetians					2,0
Tatars	4,8	3,3	5,6	7,5	10,5
Koreans	1,1	0,9	2,0	2,7	3,9
Germans	0,7	1,1	1,8	1,4	1,5
No ethnicity disclosed	11,4	12,3	23,0	27,8	49,2

Source: Naselenia Rossii 2007, Ed. By A. Vishnevskii, Fifteenth annual demographic
report. Isdatelskii Dom GU VES, Moscow 2009.

Ukraine in contrast to Kazakhstan is still the most important sender country
to EU among CIS countries. Although the main labour migration flow goes to
Russia, the proportion of migrants to the West is growing (Table 4). The coun-
tries with the largest Ukrainian diasporas are Russia, Israel, Germany and the
USA.

Official data, however, do not reflect the real scale of economic migration
from Ukraine, as the most probable number of economic migrants is about 3
million. According to the embassies of Ukraine (concerning the year 2003), in
Russia there are about 1 million Ukrainian workers, in Poland about 300 000,
in Italy and Czech Republic 200 000, in Portugal 150 000 persons, in Spain

100 000 persons, in Turkey 35 000 persons, and in the USA 20 000 (Mali-novska 2009).

Ukraine has also become a recipient of migrants since 2005. There have been inflows from Caucasus to Ukraine: as compared to 1989 the number of Azeri immigrants in Ukraine has increased by 20% and has reached 45 200. The number of Georgians has increased almost by one and a half time (to 342 000), Armenians by 1.8 times (to 99 900). In the same period the number of Koreans has increased by 50% (to 12 700), the number of Turks has risen 30-fold (to 8 800), and the number of Vietnamese has increased 8-fold (to 2 900) (Malinovska 2009).

Moldova is also a major sender country for Russia, Ukraine and the EU. The economic migration of the Moldovan population began in the late 1990s and was stimulated by the regional financial crisis which hit Russia in 1998. Moldovan economic migrants work basically in Russia or in the Mediterranean countries where the informal sector of the economy is strong (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Israel) (Mosnuaga 2009). Moldova is a divided country like Azerbaijan and Georgia. This provokes conflicts and destabilizes the economy. At least 600 000 economic migrants from this country are participating in international migration and 100 000 children live without parents (because they are working in other countries).

People in the South Caucasus actively migrate not only to Russia but also, as has been pointed out, to Ukraine, Belarus and the West. The conflicts between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh are sources for asylum seekers and for transit migration to the European Union. All three South Caucasusian countries are sources of legal and illegal migrants to Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and to the EU.

Only one third of all ethnic Armenians live in the country (3 200 000 people according to the census of 2001). The mass outflow of Armenians from Azerbaijan in 1988–1992 was about 360 000 people, the majority of whom (264 339) went to Armenia, while the rest went to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Western countries such as the USA and EU.

Azerbaijan also experienced out-migration of Azeris from Nagorny Karabakh because of the conflict with Armenia. About 782 000 people became forced migrants (or 10% of the population in Azerbaijan) and arrived in Azerbaijan itself in January, 1992. Between 1988–1994 360 000 Armenians, almost 200 000 Russians, about 18 000 Jews, 15 000 Ukrainians, 3 000 Byelorussians, as well as some Tatars and Lezghins left Azerbaijan.

Russia has been and still is the main migratory recipient of Azeri migrants. By 2002 about 1 million Azeri people lived in Russia. However over the past 16 years more than 44 000 citizens of Azerbaijan have left the republic and have officially applied for refugee status and/or became political emigrants to the West. The main target country is Germany (almost 38% of Azeri migrants),

half as many (about 19%) in the Netherlands, about 10.5% in France, 9% in Sweden and 7% in the USA (Yunusov 2009).

Until 2002 the main migration outflow from Georgia also went to Russia. But after 2002 the direction changed and migrants went to Ukraine, Belarus and Western countries because of the troubles in the relations between Georgia and Russia, which resulted in a military conflict and an outflow of refugees to Russia and the EU.

Central Asia is also a major sending area to Russia whereas till recently it was Kazakhstan. The ethnic structure of migrants from Central Asia also changed dramatically: earlier, in the 1990s, ethnic Russians moved, while now it is ethnically indigenous Central Asian people (Zaionchkovskaya 2009) (Table 5).

One can assume that contemporary population movements in CIS system are very similar to the experience of postwar Europe, when after the first waves of colonial subjects there was a major inflow of migrants from southern Europe, Turkey and the former colonies.

One of the new trends in Russia, Kazakhstan and other republics of CIS is the increase of migratory exchange with China in spite of the fact that the Commonwealth of Independent States and China belong to different migration systems. The Chinese diaspora in the world is estimated at about 35 million. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have extended joint borders with China, and growing economic cooperation is leading to an increase of immigration, now at around 500 000 to 1 mln people living in Russia. The development of large infrastructural projects in Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other republics of CIS can lead to an increase in the use of Chinese labour in these countries (Sadovskaja 2009).

New migration policy of Russia and its effects on migration inflows

Russian scholars mainly agree that the demographic crisis in Russia is shaping its new migration policy after the failure of the policy focusing on 'hunting for illegal migrants". The population of Russia is rapidly decreasing: according to the last census of 2002, in the decade since 1989 population decreased by 3.1 million in despite one of the highest inflows of migrants in the world[1] (Zainchkovskaya 2007). Some economic surveys indicate a lack of labour force in 30% of Russian enterprises. The economic development of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Byelarus also requires huge labour forces and they have also experienced a deep demographic crisis. The improvement of their economies led to competition between some industrial centers such as Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov (in Ukraine), and Kazakhstan oil and gas industries for Moldovan and Central

Asian labour migrants, a situation which pushed Russia to introduce a new migration policy from 15 January 2007 (Molodikova 2007).

One can say that the new policy supports the circulation of labour between CIS countries. For that purpose Russia and other CIS countries created a special Council of CIS countries on Migration for a better management of migration. The net migration to Russia increased from every CIS country between 2007–2008. For example it rose from 9.8 thousand people to 17.8 thousand for Ukraine and from 1.9 to 3.9 thousand migrants for Moldova (Zaionchkovskaya 2009). Partly this phenomenon can be related to the registration process, i.e. many of these people were already in Russia, but they used this opportunity for legalization (Turukanova 2009) (Graph 1).

Source: Turukanova E. Monitoring of Migration policy. Results 2007 and 2008
http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/science/science_session/detail.php?ID=27887.

Graph 1
*The share of the migrants of main donor countries in the total inflow of
international migrants in 2006–2007 to Russia (%)*

Ethnic Russians' repatriation has now almost dried up and even the so-called Compatriot program to attract ethnic Russians is not able to revitalize this tendency. But partly this situation is related to the mobilization of the traditionally immobile population of Central Asia. Table 5 on net migration indicates the increase of all flows with the beginning of the new migration policy, and it is notable that the ethnic structure of the migration inflow has changed

considerably even since last year. The new prevailing tendency in the immigration flow is of ethnically non-Russian-origin migrants (Table see above**)**.

Total net migration almost doubled, but while the number of Russians increased only by about 20% the number of migrants from the Caucasus tripled and the number of Central Asians grew 3.5 times. Partly of course this phenomenon can be related to the registration process, i.e. many of these people were already in Russia, but they used the opportunity for legalization. For example, the "flow" of Azeri people increased more than three times (Yunusov 2009), which is on a scale only comparable to the Central Asian countries.

Legal and illegal labour migration trends

Until 2007 the number of foreign workers with official work permits in the CIS countries was relatively small (about 1.8 million people including 1.7 million in Russia, 41 000 in Kazakhstan and about 13 000 in Ukraine). The official number indicated mainly Central Asian migrants and the number is growing due to the efforts of the governments of these countries to reduce the pressure of a young population on the local labour market. The share of Kyrgyz and Uzbek migrants has risen almost 3 fold, and the share of Tajiks 2 fold in Russia. These three countries provided about 41% of foreign workers or 345 000 people in 2007 (Table 5) (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

Illegal migration in contrast to legal migration in CIS countries is difficult to estimate, but for Ukraine it is evaluated as being between 1.5 and 6 mln. people, while for Russia the variation in estimated numbers is also enormous: from 3 mln. to 11 mln. people. The domination of illegal migration over legal testifies either an overly rigid migration policy unfairly narrowing legitimate space as was characteristic for Russia till 2007, or the absence of any regulation (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

The implementation of the new migration policy of Russia launched from 15 January 2007 concerning the liberalization of the labour market gave at last some idea about the number of illegal migrants, because the registered number of migrants for 2007 was 7.5 million and the number of registered economic migrants was equal to about 2.5 mln. people. Kazakhstan has legalised 165 000 illegal migrants, including 117 0000 citizens of Uzbekistan and 24 000 people from Kyrgyzstan (Molodikova 2007).

The new migration policy of Russia since 2007 changed the migration situation. Before 2007 almost half of migrants (46%) had not been registered. The new liberalization of the labour market has decreased the proportion of illegal migrants number to 15% in 2008. Until 2007 only between 15 and 25% of economic migrants worked officially, whereas in 2008 about 76% of migrants had a work permit (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

Illegal migrants try to reach EU and go through different CIS countries bordering the EU. For example, many go through Ukraine. According to the data of border guards, in 1991 the authorities detained only 148 people, but in 1994 the number was already 11 400. The highest number of detainees was in 1999 (14 600). Between 2000 and 2005 the EU tried to change the situation concerning border control in Ukraine. The latter country received over 55 million Euro from the EU for setting up check points at the border, and new electronic system (Malinovska 2009). This explains the tendency of the illegal flow to drop in recent years. So, in 1999 in Ukraine 25 300 illegal migrants were indicated, and in 2000 the number reached 27 800. After that the inflow started decreasing: 17 400 in 2003, 14 800 in 2005 and 12 600 in 2007.

The help from the EU has considerably improved the situation. Between 2003 and 2007 the authorities opened. 150 new outposts, 90 new border control points, and each check point now covers an area of only 25 km. More effective forms of monitoring and patrol system, and a visa system service with a high level of protection led to positive results. The number of detainees now does not exceed 4 000–5 000 annually (Malinovska 2009).

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a large proportion of the illegal migrants successfully reached the West, despite all efforts to control. Estimates of the efficiency of captured illegal migrants varies from 20% to 50%. Since some of the illegal migrants remain in Ukraine for a time and make numerous attempts to cross the border, the number of captured illegal migrants may exceed the real number (Malinovska 2009).

The structure of illegal migrants has changed in recent years, with an increase in the share of citizens from CIS countries. In 2005 about 50 per cent of people detained at the border were citizens of the CIS, and in 2007 this had grown to 56.2 per cent. Mainly they are citizens of Moldova, Georgia and Russia. The smugglers in Ukraine prefer to deal now with CIS citizens.

Migrants from CIS countries' often have relatives or friends in Ukraine, they speak the language and easily manage their movement in the country. They can stay for 90 days in Ukraine according to Ukrainian legislation and the price for border crossing is relatively low (for citizens of the CIS it is 1 500–5 000 Euros in comparison to 10–15 thousand euros for Asian and African migrants). Citizens of CIS countries are more attractive clients for smugglers because they are not so visible and can easily communicate, have friends or acquaintances in Ukraine and have legal opportunity to stay in Ukraine for 90 days, which is probably the reasons why their share has increased in transit illegal flows through Ukraine (Malinovska 2009).

Illegal migrants use mainly ethnic channels. For instance, the Vietnamese channel functions with fake documents made in Moscow; the Pakistani-Indian channel is connected, as a rule, to entrance with tourist visas issued in Delhi; the Sri-Lankan-Bangladeshi channel usually uses the "green border" with the

help of guides; the Afghani channel goes through Moscow; the Chinese channel is managed by Malaysians and Vietnamese; the Kurdish channel and the Uzbek-Tajik channel by their diasporas in Russia; the Chechen channel became more active after 2002, for citizens of Russia with Chechen ethnicity on the Ukrainian-Slovak or Polish border; the Moldova channel goes through the Ukrainian one and after use of the different ways crossings Ukraine , Belorussia and Baltic states (Malinovska 2009).

CIS countries' nationals usually prefer to use legal border crossings mainly with tourist visas and after that they extend their stay illegally, and the diasporas in Western countries help them to settle. For example, legalisation has allowed about 100 000–150 000 Moldavian migrants to gain legal status in Italy, Greece and Portugal (Mosnuaga 2009). In case of illegal border crossing they use intermediaries (sometimes compatriots or citizens of the countries of transit or destination).

Transit migration from East to the West: Possibilities of controlling migration

Transit migration flows are important parts of migration movements. The desire to control transit migration in the EU borderland was emphasised by the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 2002: part 1) which drew attention to transit migration and encouraged national authorities to react to it: *"the most salient migration phenomenon currently affecting Central and Eastern Europe is that of transit migrants.'* The Swedish government helped develop a response when it launched the 'Söderköping process', a 'Cross-Border Co-Operation Process' which aims to bring together some EU and non-EU countries together like Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine (Düvell 2007, 2009).

Research supported by the European Union on illegal clandestine migration in all CIS countries neighbouring the EU has confirmed that many citizens of CIS countries are willing to go to the European Union and that there is a widespread practice of using the territory of the CIS as a transit channel (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

There are certain peculiarities in Eastern Europe that facilitate transit migration (Düvell and Molodikova 2009). Many of these points have been already discussed, but it may be important to reemphasise some of them. Wide spread corruption in official institutions responsible for border and migration control allows migrants to attempt the passage to the EU many times and increases their chance of successfully crossing the border.

Previous historical relations like being educated at, for instance, Ukrainian universities or the military academy, or people who having spent some time legally working in the concerned country work as pull factors to attract migrants to Ukraine.

There is evidence of a step by step transit through Russia to the western borders of CIS in order to reach the EU. The poorly protected borders of Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan give opportunities to migrants from Asian non-CIS countries to reach EU borderland. For example, Afghans neighbourhood with Tajikistan populated by Tajik ethnic group and it is not difficult to go to Tajikistan, to buy Tajik passport and to arrive to Russia.

Xenophobic attitude as a push to factor to move further to the west

The rise of xenophobia in Russia and Ukraine contributes to the fears of migrants and refugees and pushes them to leave CIS countries. In spite the fact that Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova have legal provisions against racism and discrimination, the Helsinki Committees of these countries have stated that the militia regularly detain coloured people illegally (Malinovska 2009). The level of payments to migrants also relates to their ethnic background (Graph 2) and country of origin.

100 rubbles
Muscovites
 80–90 roubles
 Other Russian
  70–80 roubles
  Ukrainians
  Belarusians
   50 roubles
   Moldovans
    30–40 roubles
    Tajiks, Uzbeks

Source: Turukanova E. Monitoring of Migration policy. Results 2007 and 2008.
http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/science/science_session/detail.php?ID=27887.

Graph 2
Wages of economic migrants by ethnic background

Russian and Ukrainian societies have extremely negative attitudes towards migrants, despite the fact that the use of migrant labour is becoming a widespread phenomenon in the everyday life of Russians. Regardless of this, xenophobia is increasing, spurred by certain political forces. For example, 61% of the population believes that migrants increase the probability of terrorism, and 47% believe that they increase crime rates and create dangerous situations for the population. At the same time many, especially poorer groups of the population, use numerous services provided by migrants (Turukanova 2007).

About 15% of economic migrants mentioned that they know Russian only badly and about 20–40% migrants answered that they do not speak Russian well (Turukanova 2009). The reports from Moscow schools for the 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 academic years indicated an increase of the number of children to 2.5% from the families of economic migrants. About 26 000 children of economic migrants are not able to follow properly commands in Russian. The Moscow government had to establish a special one year program on Russian as a foreign language in a "School of Russian language" (Malinovska 2009).

Economic Crisis or play back strategy: "Every second migrant – go home"

The global economic crisis has created new challenges to migration policy and security. It has led to increased unemployment levels which in turn increases the sensitivity of public opinion in the host states to migrants on the labour market. The migrants' decision whether to stay or return home is not so obvious when they loose their jobs.

The crisis has heightened the fears of host countries about the destiny of migrant workers who loose their jobs abroad, forcing them to return to their home countries. In February, the Czech Republic even offered a free plane ticket and 500 Euros to foreign workers who voluntarily agree to return home after loosing their jobs. In March, trade unions in Poland called for restrictions concerning some foreign workers. Russia also a cut twice the quota for economic migrants for 2009 and tightened labour migration rules in the same month.

The demands for a cheap labour force can decrease the cost of labour in a crisis period. Some scholars argue, based on a 2003 survey, that Ukrainian women have no wish to stay abroad for ever (Montefusco 2008). But time changes plans, especially in a crisis and a survey in Moldova has shown other figures (Table 6). The care system is one of the few which is not much affected by the economic crisis, because of the nature of this service.

"Ukrainians will be the last who leave Europe," said Mykhaylo Petrunyak, president of the Association of Ukrainians in Spain.[14] IOM Moldova in Press Briefing did not report a major flow back (Notes 26 May 2009). It wrote that the economic crisis has not provoked a mass return of Moldovans home.

In Russia in the crisis of November-December 2008 about 80 000 economic migrants lost their jobs, especially in the construction industry. The strengthening of migration control in January-February of 2009 led to a 40% increase in violation of migration legislation compared to the same months in 2007, and the number of illegal migrants constituted 546 000 people (twice as high) on

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[14] Despite economic crisis, Ukrainians keep working 23 April, 20:27 Oksana Faryna, Kyiv Post Staff Wr abroad http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/40161

top of the administrative deportations (4100). The FMS inspections led to fines equal to 853 000 mln. roubles.[15]. Prime Minister Putin declaration that in crisis 50% of labour migrants have to return home was accepted by radical Russian parties as guidelines for the actions and new movement of radical youth created slogan: "Every second migrant – go home!". It is too early to evaluate the tendencies of crisis development, but xenophobic attitude in Russia does not support migration inflows.[16]

The security issue is also related to the stability of the situation in the EU neighbourhood. Both Ukraine and Moldova in recent years were subject to uncertainties and conflicts (the orange revolution and gas conflict in Ukraine, Transnistria's unsolved issue since 1992 and the Chisinau uprising in spring 2009 in Moldova). The deterioration of the economic situation in these countries may lead to a rise in the number of illegal and legal migrants and if there is some unrest it may lead to an influx of asylum seekers in neighbouring EU countries.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the two regional migration systems in Europe supported the idea of significant interconnections between the EU and the CIS migration systems. Restrictive migration policy as in the EU and in Russia does not help to eliminate illegal migration but has produced only more illegal migrants and reoriented illegal migration flows through some new migration 'corridors' from Russia to the EU.

Russia continuously plays an important role in shaping the migration system of the former Soviet countries. The gravitation of migration flows towards Russia, especially economic migration, is a very important factor for migration in some CIS countries and gives stability to these republics through remittances and easing some of the economic and demographic pressures. This is one of the reasons why the migration policy of Russia affects these countries so strongly.

Economics and demography dictate their own rules. Economic migration is needed by European countries and migrants need to get jobs to survive. The only reason to manage the situation is to find a mechanism for circulating migration; purely restrictive measures do not help.

Now the CIS countries have approached a new stage in the development of migration processes which is determined to a large extent by the natural decrease of the active population in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and (in the near future) Kazakhstan. This situation pushes them towards liberalising their labour

[15] Vlast – 2009. – 9 February 2009.www.vlast.ru/09.02.09
[16] Gritsuk M., Smoliakova T. Gastarbaiter ne konkyrent 'Rossiiskaya Gazeta",
    http://www.rg.ru/2008/11/07/ezrabotnie.html

market for foreigners, and in 2007 Russia and Kazakhstan already took some steps in the direction of legalising illegal migrants (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

The greatest labour inflow is expected in Russia, and the Asian-European transit to Western countries will also increase. The first evidence of that is the appearance and rise of share in illegal transit of the nationals of CIS countries in a western direction, which is clearly observed in Ukraine (Zaionchkovskaya 2009).

We should expect a gradual multistage shift to the West of some Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Moldavian citizens in the population of CIS countries to fill the niches formed in the labour markets in Central and Western Europe.

The niches in the labour markets of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia and Kazakhstan created by a demographic crisis, will be filled by migrants from Central Asian countries, who already promptly react to opportunities. Many experts argue that the Central Asian labour force is insufficient to satisfy the needs of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which means that China and some other Asian countries may appear as possible sending countries for European CIS countries and Kazakhstan. This process definitely will increase the ethnic diversity in these countries and transit migration as well.

The liberalization program in Russia has shown real successes in the legalization of migrants and taxes collected from migrants. Evidence of the program's success is the fact that 7.5 million former illegal migrants have legalised themselves, which will improve the economic situation in Russia. But the fears of economic crisis can destroy this success, because of some declarations that every second migrants should go home and introducing a quota system, which does not work.

The migration flows in the last ten years have slowly reoriented migrants toward Western Europe in the case of Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldova and Georgia, while migrants from Central Asian republics still have great interest in the Russian labour market, and many of them want to resettle to Russia. According to some surveys, the transit migration to the Eastern borderland of the EU has involved more migrants from CIS countries in the last five years than from other Asian and African countries. The favourable opportunities to stay and live in a visa free area allow the transit migrants of CIS countries to penetrate the borderland regions and to try to cross the borders (Malinovska 2009).

Effective migration control has to be based on a better knowledge of international migration flows in the context of the hierarchies of migration systems and labour markets. An understanding of the dynamics, scale and trends of migration processes in these systems provides the basis for the core actors (in our case the EU and Russia) to develop a common migration policy.

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